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- (21) AD Status. See TAB N, page 1.
- (22) Unit or Personnel Identification. See TAB V, page 1.
- (23) Driving of Armored Personnel Carriers from within drivers compartment. See TAB N, page 2.
- (24) KY-8 Secure Set. See TAB N, page 3.
- (25) Detainee Evaluation. See TAB N, page 3.
- (26) Search Techniques. See TAB N, page 3.
- (27) Company Hard Spots. See TAB N, page 3.
- (28) Stuck Vehicles. See TAB O, page 2.
- (29) Canal crossing. See TAB O, page 2.
- (30) Hedgerows, clearing of trip wires. See TAB Q, page 2
- (31) Use of CS. See TAB O, page 2.
- (32) Use of V Formations on road sweeps. See TAB O, page 3.
- (33) Artillery observation from OCA. See TAB O, page 3.

### C. Training

- (1) Rigging of personnel carriers for helicopter assisted recovery operations. See TAB L, page 6.
- (2) M-79 Grenade Launcher. See TAB O, page 3.
- (3) 90mm Recoilless Rifle. See TAB O, page 3.

### D. Intelligence

- (1) Possible terrorist activities on base camps. See TAB D, page 5.
- (2) Dissemination of order of battle information. See TAB D, page 5.
- (3) Use of OB analysts at brigade level.
- (4) Analysis of agent reports. See TAB D, page 6.
- (5) Recording of Local Force information. See TAB D, page 6.
- (6) Dissemination of data from captured documents were not receiving wide dissemination. See TAB D, page 6.
- (7) Enemy indirect fire techniques. See TAB D, page 7.

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- (8) Multiple counter battery programs. See TAB D, page 7.
- (9) Enemy indirect fire analysis. See TAB D, page 7.
- (10) Cover and deception for command APCs. See TAB D, page 8.
- (11) Erroneous reports. See TAB O, page 4.
- (12) Intelligence of the present. See TAB O, page 4.
- (13) Enemy mortar and rocket fire. See TAB O, page 4-5.
- (14) Command APCs. See TAB O, page 5.

### E. Logistics

- (1) Use of T-17 Membrane for helipads. See TAB F, page 3.
- (2) Lack of repair parts for low density items of equipment. See TAB F, page 4.
- (3) Critical shortages of  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicles, bucket loaders and 5 ton dump trucks. See TAB I, page 6.
- (4) Excessive Logistical Report Requirements. See TAB L, page 7.
- (5) Combat boots. See TAB M, page 3.
- (6) Need for an AN/VRC 46 in each tank. See TAB N, page 8.
- (7) Machine gun ammunition. See TAB O, page 5.
- (8) Broken torque rods, shackles and springs. See TAB O, page 5-6.
- (9) Static defensive position. See TAB O, page 6.
- (10) ASR restriction. See TAB O, page 5.

### F. Organisation

- (1) Substitute of Class J. See TAB K, page 20.
- (2) A need for a security squad to be attached to each company of a tank battalion. See TAB N, page 5.

### G. Other

- (1) 500 watt loudspeaker mount for LOG OH-6. See TAB G, page 5.
- (2) Early Word. See TAB G, page 5.

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- (3) Tail Rotor Servo Deterioration. See TAB H, page 4.
  - (4) Deterioration of the #2 bearing carbon seals in UH-1H Helicopters. See TAB H, page 4.
  - (5) OH-6A Tail Roto Pre-Flight Check. See TAB H, page 4.
  - (6) XM-129 40mm Grenade Launcher. See TAB H, page 4.
  - (7) Mortar Aerial Delivery System. (MADG) See TAB H, page 5.
  - (8) Airborne Communications Console for the LOH. See TAB H, page 5.
  - (9) Aviation. See TAB K, page 17.
  - (10) XM 517 Articulated Cargo Vehicles. See TAB K, page 17.
  - (11) Indigenous Rations. See TAB K, page 18.
  - (12) Milstrip. See TAB K, page 19.
  - (13) Obtaining Station - Type Property. See TAB K, page 19.
  - (14) STRIP Team. See TAB K, page 20.
  - (15) Commercial Contractors. See TAB K, page 20.
  - (16) PSYOPs. See TAB L, page 7 and TAB N, page 7.
  - (17) Background information on Kit Carson personnel. See TAB L, page 8.
  - (18) Food Poisoning. See TAB L, page 8.
  - (19) Medics. See TAB L, page 8.
  - (20) MEDCAP Operations. See TAB N, page 5.
3. (C) Section 3. Headquarters, Department of the Army survey information. Escape, Evasion and Survival: NONE

FOR THE COMMANDER:

15 Incl  
Tab A through Tab O

ROBERT L. FAIR  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

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AVFBC-RE-H (1 Feb 69) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division for the Period  
Ending 31 January 1969, RGS ACSFOR-65 (R-1)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 9 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHOC(DST), APO 96375  
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-LT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-  
Lessons Learned of the 25th Infantry Division for the period ending 31  
January 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



B.G. MACDONALD  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

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16 APR 1969

AVHGC-DST (1 Feb 69) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division for the Period  
Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division.

2. (U) This headquarters notes that the reporting unit failed to submit Section 2, Lessons Learned, in a consolidated, appropriate format. Coordination through the intermediate headquarters has been effected to preclude similar format errors in future reports.

3. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning personnel and administration, TAB C, paragraph 2; nonconcur. While it is recognized that the observation is true, the Infantry Division MTOE does not meet personnel requirements for operation of three permanent base camps. In order to offset this deficiency a standardized Division Base Camp TDA is being prepared which contains minimum essential equipment and personnel to augment the MTOE. The requirements cited in the evaluation (paragraph 2b) were not considered as essential base camp augmentation. Most services mentioned are available from assets outside the Division. As an example, ice cream is produced at three contract plants and made available to units through Class 1 supply points. The Post Exchange requirements should be coordinated through GI channels to the Vietnam Regional Exchange. The hold baggage office at Cu Chi is presently under study by the Tan Son Nhut Baggage Facility, US Army Headquarters Area Command (USAHAC), for consideration as a satellite of that agency. The installation coordinator is an additional duty and activities supporting installation coordination should be supplied from existing organic sections.

b. (C) Reference item concerning terrorist activities on base camps, paragraph A(1), inclosure to TAB D; concur. Stringent methods must be utilized in control of indigenous personnel at all times. This item will be published in the next edition of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

c. (C) Reference item concerning use of Order of Battle (OB) analysts at brigade level, paragraph A(3), inclosure to TAB D; concur. Recently USARV recommended MTOE changes that provide for OB personnel at separate

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division for the Period  
Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

brigade level. These changes are undergoing final processing at this headquarters and will shortly be forwarded to DA for approval. The Target Acquisition and Combat Surveillance in Vietnam (TACSIIV II) study resulted in a recommendation to place OB personnel at brigade level within divisions. This item will be published in the next edition of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC is recommended. Recommend that DA consider the TACSIIV II recommendation concerning OB personnel at brigade level in the next review of division level TO&Es.

d. (C) Reference item concerning enemy indirect fire techniques, paragraph A(7), inclosure to TAB D; concur. Realization of these enemy techniques aids counterbattery program planning. This item will be published in the next edition of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

e. (C) Reference item concerning enemy indirect fire analysis, paragraph A(9), inclosure to TAB D; concur. This item will be published in the next edition of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

f. (C) Reference item concerning cover and deception for command Armored Personnel Carriers, paragraph A(10), inclosure to TAB D; concur. The method is an excellent example of tactical deception. This item will be published in the next edition of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. Recommend USARPAC disseminate this information to other major USARPAC commands, and DA disseminate this information to other world wide commands.

g. (U) Reference item concerning 107mm mortar cartridge extension, TAB F, paragraph 21(2); concur. Requirement for unit turn in of subject items will be disseminated to all units in USARV - GA; AM monthly information letter 3-69. Distribution of this letter is made to the user level. No action required by higher headquarters.

h. (U) Reference item concerning Airborne Communications Console for the Light Observation Helicopter (LOH), TAB H, paragraph 2a(1); concur. Command action has been initiated to field 45 each OH-6 communication consoles at the earliest possible date. US Army Electronics Command (USAECOM) is expediting the shipment of all parts necessary to locally fabricate the consoles. The Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility will require 30 days to complete this project after receipt of the support package.

i. (U) Reference item concerning Deterioration of the #2 Bearing Carbon Seals in UH-1H Helicopters, TAB H, paragraph 2f(2); nonconcur. Proper T53-113 shut-down procedures have been reviewed with US Army Aviation Support Command (USAAVSCOM) and published in USARV Flight Standardization Letter 69-2 dated 21 January 1969, which states "For engine shut



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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division for the Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

down all T53-L13 engines will be reduced to flight idle with a minimum beep for two minutes prior to turning the throttle to the off position."

j. (U) Reference item concerning OH-6A Tail Rotor Pre-Flight Check, TAB H, paragraph 2f(3); concur. Recommended procedure has been forwarded to 34th General Support Group for inclusion in their monthly maintenance newsletter.

k. (U) Reference item concerning SM-129 40mm Grenade Launcher, TAB H, paragraph 2g(1); nonconcur. TM 9-1090-203-12 (Operator and Organizational Maintenance Manual, SM-28) calls for preventative maintenance inspections on the 40mm Grenade Launcher after 1,000 and 5,000 rounds, and replacement of the feed pawl after 10,000 rounds. The arbitrary change of these parts at 2,500 rounds would not be in the best interests of supply economy. A better solution to the problem encountered would be to inspect and replace only as necessary after 2,500 rounds and submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation to alert Weapons Command that the parts are not meeting design specifications.

l. (U) Reference item concerning Mortar Aerial Delivery System (MADS) TAB H, paragraph 2g(2); nonconcur insofar as utilization by other general support aviation units. This system has been found to be useful in the 25th Infantry Division Tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), to deliver ordinance that otherwise cannot be effectively placed due to heavy jungle canopy. MADS is, in some situations, considered by the 25th Infantry Division to be an effective substitute for infantry high angle of fire weapons that cannot be employed due to triple overhead canopy jungle. The system is not recommended for use by other aviation units as in other types of terrain, the stand off capability of armed helicopters employing rockets is considered an adequate fire support means.

m. (U) Reference item concerning personnel, page 3, TAB I, paragraph 2A(1). Concur in the statement that more information would be beneficial; however, advance notification by this headquarters is not feasible. The number, grade and MOS of replacements are not absolute until physical arrival of personnel in this command. Upon arrival, replacements are assigned on an equitable basis in accordance with assignment priorities.

n. (U) Reference item concerning some form of special recognition for Combat Engineer soldiers, page 3, TAB I, paragraph 2A(3); nonconcur. The establishment of the combat badge for other arms of service has been studied many times by DA; however, in order not to undermine the prestige of the CMB and CIB, such requests have not been favorably considered.

o. (U) Reference item concerning Aviation, TAB K, page 17, paragraph 2d(1); concur. Action has been taken to issue additional tail rotor dynamic

AVHOC-DST (1 Feb 69) SA L&A  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division for the Period  
Ending 31 January 1969, R03 OAFOR-65 (A1)

balancing kits received in RVN subsequent to cut-off date of this Operational  
Report-Lessons Learned (OULL). US Army Aviation Support Command (USAIVSACOM)  
representative at USARV Headquarters has been requested to ascertain if new  
packaging and acceptance procedures are required for OH-6A tail rotors.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON  
1LT, ACC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
25th Inf Div  
II FFV

CSFOR-65 (1 Feb 69) 34 Ind (U)

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report of BQ, 25th Inf Div for Period Ending  
31 January 1969, BCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

BQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96358 21 MAY 1969

**TO:** Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding inderec-  
ments and concurs in the report as indicated.

**FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:**

  
C. L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Act AG

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## Organization For Combat

1 November

### 1st Brigade

3rd Bn, 22nd Inf (-C)  
4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Inf  
C, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf  
B, 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav  
7th Bn, 11th Arty (105) (DS)  
A, 65th Engr Bn (DS)

### 3rd Brigade

1st Bn, 27th Inf  
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf  
2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf  
2nd Bn, 77th Arty (105) (DS)  
D, 65th Engr Bn (DS)

### Division Support Command

725th Maint Bn  
25th Med Bn  
25th S & T Bn  
Recon, 4th Bn, 9th Inf

### II Field Force Artillery

B, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty (105) (GSR)  
C, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty (105) (GSR)  
1st Bn, 27th Arty (155) (GSR)  
2nd, Bn, 32nd Arty (175/8") (GSR)

### 2nd Brigade

4th Bn, 9th Inf (-Recon)  
2nd Bn, 14th Inf  
2nd Bn, 27th Inf (-A)  
TF 2nd Bn, 34th Armor (-B,C)  
A, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf  
2nd Bn, 12th Inf  
1st Bn, 8th Arty (105) (DS)  
C, 65th Engr Bn (DS)

### Division Troops

3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav  
F Co, 30th Inf (LRP)  
C, 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav  
25th Avn Bn  
65th Engr Bn (-A,C,U.)  
125th Sig Bn  
25th Military Intelligence Det  
25th Military Police Company

### Division Artillery

3rd Bn, 13th Arty (155/8") (GS)  
B, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (GSR 2nd Bn, 77th Arty)  
C, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (GSR 1st Bn, 8th Arty)

2 November

No Change

3 November

The only change in the task organization took place in the 1st Brigade. Co Company, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry returned to its parent unit. B Company of the battalion replaced C Company as an independent unit within the brigade to provide security for the signal facility on the summit of NUI BA DEN mountain.

4 November

The only change in the task organization involved the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) with one cavalry squadron, the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, coming under the operational control of the division.

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5 November

## 1st Brigade

3rd Bn, 22nd Inf (-B)  
4th Bn, (Mech), 23rd Inf  
B, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf  
7th Bn, 11th Arty (105) (CS)  
A, 65th Engr Bn (DS)

## 1st Brigade, 1st Cav. Div

1st Cavalry Div (Air Mobile)  
1st Sqdn, 7th Cav  
1st Sqdn, 5th Cav  
A, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav  
A, 2nd Bn, 20th Arty (ARA) (DS)  
B, 1st Bn, 21st Arty (105) (DS)  
B, 1st Bn, 77th Arty (105) (DS)  
A, 8th Engr Bn (DS)

## Division Support Command

725th Maint Bn  
25th Med Bn  
25th S&T Bn  
Recon, 4th Bn, 9th Inf

## II Field Force Artillery

B, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty (105) (GSR)  
C, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty (105) (GSR)  
1st Bn, 27th Arty (105) (GSR)  
2nd Bn, 32nd Arty (175/8") (GSR)

## 2nd Brigade

4th Bn, 9th Inf (-Recon)  
2nd Bn, 14th Inf  
2nd Bn, 27th Inf (-A)  
TF 2nd Bn, 34th Armor (-B,C)  
2nd Bn, 12th Inf  
1st Bn, 8th Arty (105) (DS)  
C, 65th Engr Bn (DS)

## 3rd Brigade

1st Bn, 27th Inf  
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf  
2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf  
2nd Bn, 77th Arty (105) (DS)  
D, 65th Engr Bn

## Division Troops

3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav  
F Co, 50th Inf (LRP)  
C, 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav  
25th Avn Bn  
65th Engr Bn  
125th Sig Bn  
25th Military Intelligence Det  
25th Military Police Company

## Division Artillery

3rd Bn, 13th Arty (155/8") (GS)  
E, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (GSR 2nd Bn, 77th Arty)  
C, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (GSR 1st Bn, 8th Arty)

6 November

The only change involved the addition of units to the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile). The task organization for this unit for the day was as follows:

1st Sqdn, 7th Cav  
1st Sqdn, 5th Cav  
1st Sqdn, 8th Cav  
A, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav  
A, 229th Avn Bn (UHID)  
C, 229th Avn Bn (UHID)  
B, 228th Avn Bn (CH-47)  
A, 2nd Bn, 20th Arty (ARA) (DS)  
B, 1st Bn, 21st Arty (105) (DS)  
B, 1st Bn, 77th Arty (105) (DS)  
C, 2nd Bn, 19th Arty (105) (DS)  
A, 8th Engr Bn (DS)

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7 November

No Change

8 November

The only change to the task organization involved the addition of B Battery, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155) as a direct support unit to the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile).

9 November

The only change to the task organization occurred within the 2nd brigade. C Company, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry was placed under the operational control of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry.

10 November

The 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) returned to the control of its parent division. In the 2nd Brigade, C Company, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry returned to the control of its parent unit from 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry. B Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry was placed under the operational control of Task Force 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor.

11 November

In the 2nd Brigade, B Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry returned to the control of its parent unit from Task Force, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor. In the 3rd Brigade, B Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry was placed under the operational control of the 2nd Battalion (Mech), 22nd Infantry. In II Field Force Artillery, C Battery, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery was removed from the control of its parent unit and departed the division area.

12 November

In the 3rd Brigade, B Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry returned to the control of its parent unit. In the 2nd Brigade, A Company, 2nd Battalion 27th Infantry returned to the control of its parent unit from Task Force 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor and was replaced by B Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Inf.

13 November

No Change

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14 November

The only change in the division task organization occurred in the 2nd Brigade. The 1st Platoon, A Company, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor was placed under the operational control of the 5th Battalion, 9th Infantry.

15 November

The only change in the task organization involved the 2nd Brigade when the 1st Platoon, A Company, 34th Armor returned to the control of its parent unit.

16 November

No Change

17 November

No Change

18 November

## 1st Brigade

3rd Bn, 22nd Inf (-B)  
4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Inf  
B, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf  
B, 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav  
7th Bn, 11th Arty (105) (DS)  
A, 65th Engr Bn (DS)

## 3rd Brigade

1st Bn, 27th Inf (-1 Plt D)  
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf (-C)  
2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf  
A, 4th Bn, 9th Inf  
D, 4th Bn, 9th Inf  
1 Plt D, 1st Bn, 27th Inf  
2nd Bn, 77th Arty (105) (DS)  
B, 65th Engr Bn (DS)

## Division Troops

3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav  
F Co, 50th Inf (LRP)  
C, 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav  
25th Avn Bn  
65th Engr Bn (-A,C,D)  
125th Sig Bn  
25th Military Intelligence Det  
25th Military Police Co.

## 2nd Brigade

4th Bn, 9th Inf (-Recon, A,D,  
C, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf  
2nd Bn, 14th Inf  
2nd Bn, 27th Inf (-A,B)  
TF 2nd Bn, 34th Armor  
A, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf  
B, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf  
2nd Bn, 12th Inf  
1st Bn, 8th Arty (105) (DS)  
C, 65th Engr Bn (DS)

## Division Artillery

3rd Bn, 13th Arty (155/8") (GSR)  
B, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (GSR, 2nd  
Bn, 77th Arty)  
C, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (GSR, 1st  
Bn, 8th Arty)

## II Field Force Artillery

B, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty (105) (GSR)  
C, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty (105) (GSR)  
1st Bn, 27th Arty (-C)(155)(GSR)  
2nd Bn, 32nd Arty (175/8") (GSR)

## Division Support Command

725th Maint Bn  
25th Med Bn  
25th S & T Bn  
Recon, 4th Bn, 9th Inf

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19 November

1st Brigade

3rd Bn, 22nd Inf (-B)  
4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Inf  
B, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf  
B, 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav  
7th Bn, 11th Arty (105)(DS)  
A, 65th Engr Bn (DS)

3rd Brigade

4th Bn, 9th Inf (-C)  
1st Bn, 27th Inf  
2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf  
C, 4th Bn, 9th Inf  
2nd Bn, 77th Arty (105)(DS)  
D, 65th Engr Bn (DS)

Division Artillery

3rd Bn, 13th Arty (155/8\*)(GS)  
B, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (GSR 2nd Bn,  
77th Arty)  
C, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (GSR 1st Bn,  
8th Arty)

II Field Force Artillery

B, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty (105)(GSR)  
C, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty (105)(GSR)  
1st Bn, 27th Arty (-C)(155)  
2nd Bn, 32nd Arty (175/8\*)

2nd Brigade

1st Bn, (Mech), 5th Inf  
2nd Bn, 14th Inf  
2nd Bn, 27th Inf (-B)  
TF 2nd Bn, 34th Armor  
B, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf  
2nd Bn, 12th Inf  
1st Bn, 8th Arty (105)(DS)  
C, 65th Engr (DS)

Division Troops

3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav  
C, 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav  
25th Avn Bn  
65th Engr Bn (-A,C...)  
125th Sig Bn  
25th Military Intelligence Det  
25th Military Police Co

Division Support Command

725th Maint Bn  
25th Med Bn  
25th S & T Bn

20 November

No Change

21 November

The only change in the task organization was in the 2nd Brigade where 1st Platoon, A Company, 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry was placed under the operational control of Task Force, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor.

22 November

No Change

23 November

No Change

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24 November

The only changes in the task organization took place in the 2nd Brigade where A Company, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry was placed under the operational control of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, and in the 1st Brigade where B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry returned to division control.

25 November

## 1st Brigade

3rd Bn, 22nd Inf (-B)  
4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Inf  
B, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf  
7th Bn, 11th Arty (105)(DS)  
A, 65th Engr Bn (DS)

## 3rd Brigade

4th Bn, 9th Inf (-C)  
1st Bn, 27th Inf (-1 Plt B)  
2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf  
C, 4th Bn, 9th Inf  
1 Plt, B, 1st Bn, 27th Inf  
2nd Bn, 77th Arty (105)(DS)  
D, 65th Engr Bn

## Division Troops

D, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav  
F Co, 50th Inf (LRP)  
B, 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav  
C, 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav  
25th Avn Bn  
65th Engr Bn (-A,D,C.)  
125th Sig Bn  
25th Military Intelligence Det  
25th Military Police Co

## 2nd Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf (-1 Plt A)  
2nd Bn, 14th Inf  
2nd Bn, 27th Inf (B)  
TF 2nd Bn, 34th Armor (-B,C)  
B, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf  
1 Plt, A, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf  
2nd Bn, 12th Inf  
3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav. (-D)  
1st Bn, 8th Arty (105)(DS)  
C, 65th Engr Bn

## Division Artillery

3rd Bn, 13th Arty (155/8\*)(DS)  
B, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (GSR 2nd Bn,  
77th Arty)  
C, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (GSR 1st Bn,  
8th Arty)

## II Field Force Artillery

B, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty (105)(GSR)  
C, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty (105)(GSR)  
1st Bn, 27th Arty (155)(GSR)  
2nd Bn, 32nd Arty (175/8\*)(GSR)

## Division Support Command

725th Maint Bn  
25th Med Bn  
25th S & T Bn

26 November

The only change in the task organization took place in the 2nd Brigade where A Company, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry came under the operational control of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry and in the 3rd Brigade where C Company, 4th Battalion 9th Infantry returned to the control of its parent unit from the 2nd Battalion (Mech), 22nd Infantry and was replaced by A Company, 4th Battalion 9th Infantry

27 November

No Change

A-6

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# CONFIDENTIAL